Learning with Errors is easy with quantum samples by Grilo, Alex B. et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
2.
08
25
5v
2 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
10
 A
pr
 20
18
Learning with Errors is easy with quantum samples
Alex B. Grilo1, Iordanis Kerenidis1, and Timo Zijlstra2
1 IRIF, CNRS, Universite´ Paris Diderot, Paris, France and
2 Lab-STICC, Universite´ Bretagne Sud
Learning with Errors is one of the fundamental problems in computational learning theory and has in the
last years become the cornerstone of post-quantum cryptography. In this work, we study the quantum sample
complexity of Learning with Errors and show that there exists an efficient quantum learning algorithm (with
polynomial sample and time complexity) for the Learning with Errors problem where the error distribution is
the one used in cryptography. While our quantum learning algorithm does not break the LWE-based encryption
schemes proposed in the cryptography literature, it does have some interesting implications for cryptography:
first, when building an LWE-based scheme, one needs to be careful about the access to the public-key generation
algorithm that is given to the adversary; second, our algorithm shows a possible way for attacking LWE-based
encryption by using classical samples to approximate the quantum sample state, since then using our quantum
learning algorithm would solve LWE. Finally, we extend our results and show quantum learning algorithms for
three related problems: Learning Parity with Noise, Learning with Rounding and Short Integer Solution.
I. INTRODUCTION
The large amount of data arising in the real world,
for example through scientific observations, large-scale
experiments, internet traffic, social media, etc, makes it
necessary to be able to predict some general properties
or behaviors of the data from a limited number of sam-
ples of the data. In this context, Computational Learning
Theory provides rigorousmodels for learning and studies
the necessary and sufficient resources, for example, the
number of samples or the running time of the learning
algorithm. In his seminal work, Valiant [30] introduced
the model of PAC learning, and since then this model has
been extensively studied and has given rise to numerous
extensions.
In another revolutionary direction, Quantum Comput-
ing takes advantage of the quantum nature of small-scale
systems as a computational resource. In this field, the
main question is to understand what problems can be
solved more efficiently in a quantum computer than in
classical computers. In the intersection of the two fields,
we have Quantum Learning Theory, where we ask if
quantum learning algorithms can be more efficient than
classical ones.
One of course needs to be careful about defining quan-
tum learning and more precisely, what kind of access to
the data a quantum learning algorithm has. On one hand,
we can just provide classical samples to the quantum
learning algorithm that can then use the quantum power
in processing these classical data. In the more general
scenario, we allow the quantum learning algorithm to re-
ceive quantum samples of the data, for a natural notion
of a quantum sample as a superposition that corresponds
to the classical sample distribution.
More precisely, in classical learning, the learning al-
gorithm is provided with samples of (x, f (x)), where x
is drawn from some unknown distribution D and f is the
function we wish to learn. The goal of the learner in this
case is to output a function g such that with high proba-
bility (with respect to the samples received), f and g are
close, i.e., Pr [ f (x) 6= g(x)] is small when x is drawn
from the same distribution D.
The extension of this model to the quantum setting is
that the samples now are given in the form of a quan-
tum state ∑x
√
D(x) |x〉 | f (x)〉. Note that one thing the
quantum learner can do with this state is simply measure
it in the computational basis and get a classical sample
from the distribution D. Hence, a quantum sample is at
least as powerful as a classical sample. The main ques-
tion is whether the quantum learner can make better use
of these quantum samples and provide an advantage in
the number of samples and/or running time compared to
a classical learner.
In this work we focus on one of the fundamental prob-
lems in learning theory, the Learning with Errors (LWE).
In LWE, one is given samples of the form
(a, a · s + e (mod q))
where s ∈ Fnq is fixed, a ∈ Fnq is drawn uniformly at
random and e ∈ Fq is an ’error’ term drawn from some
distribution χ. The goal is to output s, while minimizing
the number of samples used and the computation time.
First, LWE is the natural generalisation of the well-
studied Learning Parity with Noise problem (LPN),
which is the case of q = 2. Moreover, a lot of atten-
tion was drawn to this problem when Regev [27] reduced
some (expected to be) hard problems involving lattices to
LWE. With this reduction, LWE has become the corner-
stone of current post-quantum cryptographic schemes.
Several cryptographic primitives proposals such as Fully
Homomorphic Encryption [13], Oblivious Transfer [26],
Identity based encryption [1, 15, 19], and others schemes
are based in the hardness of LWE (for a more complete
list see Ref. [23] and Ref. [25]).
Classically, Blum et al. [11] proposed the first sub-
exponential algorithm for this problem, where both sam-
ple and time complexities are 2O(n/ log n). Then, Arora
and Ge [4] improved the time complexity for LWE with
a learning algorithm that runs in 2O˜(n
2ε) time, for some
ε < 12 , and it uses at least Ω(q
2 log q) samplesFor LPN,
Lyubashevsky [22] has proposed an algorithm with sam-
ple complexity n1+ε at the cost of increasing computa-
tion time to O(2n/ log log n).
II. THE QUANTUM LEARNINGMODEL
In this work, we use the model of learning under the
uniform distribution where the learner receives samples
according to the uniform distribution and outputs the ex-
act function with high probability. In the quantum set-
ting, the learning algorithm is given quantum samples,
namely a uniform superposition of the inputs and func-
tion values,
∑
x∈X
1√|X| |x〉 | f (x)〉 .
In this work, we are interested in noisy samples, that
can be modeled by setting f (x) = g(x) + e(x, r), where
g and e are deterministic functions, x ∈ X and r ∈ R
is the randomness necessary to generate the noise. For
defining the quantum sample, we start with the superpo-
sition
1√|R| ∑r∈R |r〉
(
1√|X| ∑x∈X |x〉 |g(x) + e(x, r)〉
)
,
and then the register corresponding to the randomness is
traced out. It means that with probability 1|R| the quan-
tum sample is
1√|X| |x〉 |g(x) + e(x, r)〉 ,
for each possible value r ∈ R.
We consider the noise model defined in Bshouty and
Jackson [14], where independent noise is added for
each element in the superposition, in other words, r =
(r1, ..., r|X|) and e(x, r) = e′(rx). This model is a natu-
ral generalisation for quantum samples with noise since
it can be seen as a superposition of the classical samples.
In contrast, Cross et al. [17] proposed a noise function
that is independent of x. Although our noise model might
require exponentiallymore resources to implement quan-
tum samples, we show that this does not make the prob-
lem intractable. Also, this is the kind of state we would
get after solving the index erasure problem.
III. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
In this work we study quantum algorithms for solving
LWE with quantum samples. Let us be more explicit on
the definition of a quantum sample for the LWE problem.
We assume that the quantum learning algorithm receives
samples in the form
1√
qn ∑
a∈Fnq
|a〉 |a · s + ea (mod q)〉 , (1)
where ea are iid random variables from some distribution
χ over Fq.
As expected, the performance of the learning algo-
rithm, both in the classical and quantum case, is sensitive
to the noise model adopted, i.e. to the distribution χ.
When LWE is used in cryptographic schemes, the
distribution χ has support on a small interval around
0, either uniform or a discrete gaussian. We prove that
for such distributions, there exists an efficient quantum
learner for LWE.
Main Result[informal] For error distributions χ used
in cryptographic schemes, and for any η > 0, there
exists a quantum learning algorithm that solves LWE
with probability 1 − η using O(n log 1η ) samples and
running time poly(n, log 1η ).
Another interesting feature of our quantum learner is
that it is conceptually a very simple algorithm based
on one of the basic quantum operations, the Quantum
Fourier Transform. Such algorithms have even started to
be implemented, of course for very small input sizes and
for the binary case [28]. Nevertheless, as far as quan-
tum algorithms are concerned, our learner is quite feasi-
ble from an implementation point of view.
The approach to solve the problem is a generalisa-
tion of Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm [10]: we start with
a quantum sample, apply a Quantum Fourier Transform
over Fq on each qudit, and then, we measure in the com-
putational basis. Our analysis shows that, when the last
qudit is not 0, which happens with high probability, the
value of the remaining registers gives s with constant
probability. We can then repeat this process so that our
algorithm outputs s with high probability.
We also use the same technique in quantum learning
algorithms for three related problems. First, we gener-
alise the result proposed by Cross et al. [17] and Riste` et
al. [28] for the LPN problem. The main difference with
their work is that we start with a quantum sample, i.e.
a state where the noise is independent for each element
in the superposition. Second, we show how to solve the
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Learning with Rounding problem, which can be seen as a
derandomized version of LWE. Finally, we also propose
a quantum learning algorithm for another relevant prob-
lem in cryptography, the Short Integer Solution problem.
A. Related work
We now review some results on quantum algorithms
for learning problems. For a more extended introduction,
see the survey by Arunachalam and de Wolf [6].
The first approach on trying to solve learning prob-
lems with quantum samples was proposed by Bshouty
and Jackson [14], where they prove that DNFs can be
learned efficiently, even when the samples are noisy. No
such efficient learners are known classically.
Despite not presenting it as a learning problem, Bern-
stein and Vazirani [10] show how to learn parity using a
single quantum sample, while classically we need a lin-
ear number of samples.
Some years later, Servedio and Gortler [29] showed
that classical and quantum sample/query complexity of
learning problems are polynomially related, but they
showed that for time complexity there exist exponential
separations between classical and quantum learning (as-
suming standard computational hardness assumptions).
Then, Ambainis et al. [3], Atici and Servedio [7], and
Hunziker et al. [20] provided general upper bounds on
the query complexity for learning problems that depend
on the size of the concept class being learned.
On specific problems, Atici and Servedio [8] and
Belovs [9] provided quantum algorithms for learning
juntas and Cross et al. [17] proposed and implemented
quantum algorithms for LPN in a different noise model.
Recently, Arunachalam and de Wolf [5] proved opti-
mal bounds for the quantum sample complexity of the
Quantum PAC model.
B. Relation to LWE-based cryptography
As we have mentioned, LWE is used in cryptography
for many different tasks. Let us briefly describe how one
can build an encryption scheme based on LWE [27]. The
key generation algorithm produces a secret key s ∈ Fq,
while the public key consists of a sequence of classi-
cal LWE samples (a1, a1 · s+ e1 (mod q)), ..., (am, am ·
s + em (mod q)), where the error comes from a distri-
bution with support in a small interval around 0. For the
encryption of a bit b, the party picks a subset S of [m]
uniformly at random and outputs(
∑
i∈S
ai (mod q), b
⌈ q
2
⌉
+ ∑
i∈S
ai · s + ei (mod q)
)
.
For the decryption, knowing s allows one to find b. The
security analysis of the encryption scheme postulates that
if an adversary can break the encryption efficiently then
he is also able to solve the LWE problem efficiently.
The algorithm we present here does not break the
above LWE-based encryption scheme. Nevertheless, it
has interesting implications for cryptography.
First, our algorithm shows a possible way for attacking
LWE-based encryption: use classical samples to approx-
imate the quantum sample state, and then use our algo-
rithm to solve LWE. One potential way for this would be
to start with m classical samples and create the following
superposition
∑
S⊆[m]
|S〉
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈S
ai (mod q)
〉 ∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈S
ai · s + ei (mod q)
〉
.
This operation is in fact efficient. Then, in order to ap-
proximate the quantum sample state, one would need to
’forget’ the first register that contains the index informa-
tion about which subset of the m classical samples we
took. In the most general case, such an operation of for-
getting the index of the states in a quantum superposition,
known as index-erasure (see Aharonov and Ta-Shma [2]
and Ambainis et al. [3]), is exponentially hard, and a
number of problems, such as Graph Non-isomorphism,
would have an efficient quantum algorithm, if we could
do it efficiently. Nevertheless, one may try to use the ex-
tra structure of the LWE problem to find sub-exponential
algorithms for this case.
A second concern that our algorithm raises is that
when building an LWE-based scheme, one needs to be
careful on the access to the public-key generation algo-
rithm that is given to the adversary. It is well-known
that for example, even in the classical case, if the ad-
versary can ask classical queries to the LWE oracle,
then he can easily break the scheme: by asking the
same query many times one can basically average out
the noise and find the secret s. However, if we just as-
sume that the public key is given as a box that an agent
has passive access to it, in the sense that he can request
a random sample and receive one, then the encryption
scheme is secure classically as long as LWE is diffi-
cult. However, imagine that the random sample from
LWE is provided by a device that creates a superposi-
tion 1√
qn ∑a∈Fnq |a〉 |a · s + ea (mod q)〉 and then mea-
sures it. Then a quantum adversary that has access to this
quantum state can break the scheme. Again, our claim
is, by no means, that our algorithm breaks the proposed
LWE-based encryption schemes, but more that LWE-
based schemes which are secure classically (assuming
the hardness of LWE) may stop being secure against
quantum adversaries if the access to the public key gen-
eration algorithm becomes also quantum.
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A similar situation has also appeared in the symmet-
ric key cryptography with the so called superposition at-
tacks [12, 18, 21, 31]. There, the attacker has the ability
to query the encryption oracle in superposition, and in
this way, she can in fact break many schemes that are
assumed to be secure classically. While in the case of
symmetric cryptography, the attacker must have quan-
tum access to the encryption oracle in order to break the
system, our results show that in the case of LWE-based
public-key encryption, the attacker must have quantum
access to the public key generation algorithm.
IV. ALGORITHM FOR LWE
In this section we present the extension of the
Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm for higher order fields and
analyse its behaviour with LWE samples.
We show now the Field Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm
[10] and its main component is the Quantum Fourier
Transform over Fq, QFT |j〉 = 1√qn ∑
qn−1
k=0 ω
jk |k〉.
Field Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm
Input: |ψ〉 ∈ (C2)⊗n+1
Output: s˜ ∈ Fnq ∪ {⊥}
Apply QFT⊗n+1 on |ψ〉.
Measure in the computational basis
Let |j〉 |j∗〉 be the output
If j∗ 6= 0, return −(j∗)−1 j (mod q)
Else, return ⊥
For warming-up, we show the behaviour of Field
Bernstein-Vazirani for learning linear functions without
noise in Section IVA and then in Section IVB we anal-
yse it for LWE samples.
A. Quantum algorithm for learning a linear function
without error
If the input |ψ〉 is a noiseless quantum sample of a
linear function, namely
|ψ〉 = 1√
qn ∑
a∈Fnq
|a〉 |a · s (mod q)〉 , (2)
Then the Field-Bernstein Vazirani outputs the correct
value with probability
q−1
q : after applying the QFT on
each qudit of eq. (2), we get the state
1
qn+
1
2
∑
a,j∈Fnq
∑
j∗∈Fq
ωa·(j+j
∗s) |j〉 |j∗〉 .
It is not hard to see that the probability that for all i ∈ [n],
we have j = −j∗s (mod q) and j∗ 6= 0 is
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
qn+
1
2
∑
j∗∈F∗q
∑
a∈Fnq
ω0 |−j∗s (mod q)〉
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
q− 1
q
.
Therefore, if j∗ 6= 0, we can retrieve s by outputting
−(j∗)−1 ji (all operations mod q).
B. Analysis of the algorithm for noisy samples
In this section we show that the Field Bernstein-
Vazirani algorithm works even if the input is noisy. In-
stead of the superposition of all elements in Fnq , we prove
our result here for a more general case where the quan-
tum sample has the form
|ψ〉 = 1√
v
∑
a∈V
|a〉 |a · s + ea(mod q)〉 ,
where v ∈ [qn] is a fixed value, V be a random subset
of Fnq of size v and ea is a random noise. In this case,
for every quantum sample, a new subset V of size v is
picked independently at random.
Theorem IV.1. Fix v ∈ [qn]. Let V ⊆ Fnq be a random
subset of Fnq such that |V| = v, and let
|ψ〉 = 1√
v
∑
a∈V
|a〉 |a · s + ea(mod q)〉 ,
where the ea are random variables with absolute value
at most k. The Field Bernstein-Vazirani(|ψ〉) outputs s
with probability v20kqn .
Proof. If we apply QFT on the state |ψ〉, we have
1√
qn+1v
∑
a∈V
∑
j∈Fnq ,j∗∈Fq
ωea j
∗+a·(j+j∗s) |j〉 |j∗〉 .
From the last equation, we have that the probability
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that j = −j∗s (mod q) and j∗ 6= 0 is:
1
qn+1v
∥∥∥∥∥∥∑a∈V ∑j∗∈F∗q ω
ea j
∗ |−j∗s (mod q)〉 |j∗〉
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
1
qn+1v
∑
j∗∈F∗q
(
∑
a∈V
R(ωeaj
∗
)
)2
+
(
∑
a∈V
I(ωea j
∗
)
)2
≥ 1
qn+1v
∑
j∗∈F∗q
j∗≤ γqk
(
∑
a∈V
R(ωeaj
∗
)
)2
≥ γv cos (2piγ)
2
kqn
.
where γ ∈ (0, 14 ) R(z) and I(z) are the real and
imaginary part of z, respectively. For the first inequal-
ity, we have removed some positive quantities, and the
last inequality follows from the fact that R(ωeaj
∗
) ≤
cos (2piγ) for j∗ ≤ γqk and |ea| ≤ k. The result follows
by maximizing the quantity over all γ ∈ (0, 14 ).
We now propose an algorithm that tests a candidate
solution.
Test Candidate
Input: s˜ ∈ Fnq , M ∈ Z+
Output: Accept/reject
Repeat M times.
Pick sample |ψ〉 = 1√
v
∑a∈V |a〉 |a · s + ea mod q〉.
Measure the sample in the computational basis
Let (a′, a′ · s + ea′) be the output
If |a′ · s + ea′ − a′ · s˜| > k, reject
Accept
Lemma IV.2. For s˜ = s, Test Candidate(s˜, M) accepts
with probability 1, while for s˜ 6= s, Test Candidate(s˜, M)
accepts with probability probability at most
(
2k+1
q
)M
.
Proof. Since |a′ · s + ea′ − a′ · s| = |ea′ | ≤ k by the
noise distribution, it follows that the test passes with
probability 1 when s˜ = s.
For a value a′ picked uniformly random from Fnq , it
follows that a′ · (s − s˜) + ea′ mod q is uniformly dis-
tributed over Fq if s˜ 6= s. Therefore, the probability that
it lies in the interval [−k, k] is 2k+1q . Since the probabil-
ity is independent for every iteration, the probability that
s˜ is accepted on M iterations is
(
2k+1
q
)M
.
In Appendix B, we show how to use the previous al-
gorithms to achieve the following theorem.
Theorem IV.3. For dimension n, let q be a prime in the
interval [2n
γ
, 2 · 2nγ). Let
|ψ〉 = 1√
qn ∑
a∈Fnq
|a〉 |a · s + ea〉 ,
where the ea are random variables drawn from a noise
distribution with noise magnitude at most k = poly(n).
There is an algorithm that outputs s with probability 1−
η with sample complexity O(k log 1η ) and running time
poly(n, log 1η ).
We show then how to extend the result to related prob-
lems in Appendix C.
V. OPEN PROBLEMS
A. Generalizing from linear functions
Learning linear functions can be seen as finding a hid-
den subgroup H = a|a · s = 0 of Znq . Efficient algo-
rithms for general Abelian Hidden Subgroup Problem
are known [16][24], and we leave as an open question
if these algorithms are also tolerant to noise.
B. LWE over rings
Due to technical reasons regarding the representa-
tion of polynomials in Ring-LWE instances (see Ap-
pendix C 2 for more details), our LWE algorithm cannot
be used to solve Ring-LWE with quantum samples and
we leave this question as an open problem.
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Appendix A: Notation
For n ∈ N, we define [n] := {1, ..., n}. For a com-
plex number x = a + ib, a, b ∈ R, we define its norm
|x| by
√
a2 + b2, its real part R(x) = a and its imag-
inary part I(x) = b. We denote ω as the q-th root of
unity, where q will be clear by the context. For a field Fq
and element a ∈ Fq, we denote |a| as the unique value
b ∈
[−(q−1)
2 ,
q−1
2
]
such that b ≡ a (mod q).
We remind now the notation for quantum information
and computation. For readers not familiar with these
concepts we refer Ref. [15]. Let {ei} be the standard
basis for the q-dimensional Hilbert space Cq. We denote
here |i〉 = ei and a q-dimensional qudit is a unit vector
in this space, i.e. |ψ〉 = ∑i∈Fq αi |i〉, for αi ∈ C and
∑i∈Fq |αi|2 = 1. We call the state a qubit when q = 2.
A k-qudit quantum state is a unit vector in the complex
Hilbert space Cq
k
and we shorthand the basis states for
this space |i1〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |ik〉 with |i1〉 ... |ik〉.
Appendix B: An efficient quantum learning algorithm for
LWE
In this section we show how to use Theorem IV.1
and lemma IV.2 in order to solve solve LWE with quan-
tum samples using noise distributions proposed in Brak-
erski and Vaikuntanathan [3], proving Theorem IV.3.
There, the field order q is sub-exponential in the di-
mension n, generally in [2n
γ
, 2 · 2nγ) for some constant
γ ∈ (0, 1), while the noise distribution χ produces sam-
ples with magnitude at most polynomial in n (for in-
stance linear).
LWE Algorithm(L, M)
Input: L, M ∈ Z+
Output: s˜ ∈ Fnq ∪ {⊥}
Repeat L times:
Pick a quantum sample |ψ〉
Run the Field Bernstein-Vazirani(|ψ〉) to get output s˜
Run Test Candidate(s˜, M)
If s˜ passes the test, return s˜
Return ⊥.
Theorem B.1. LWE Algorithm(L, M) outputs s with
probability
1−
(
1− v
20kqn
)L
−
(
3k
q
)M
L.
Proof. LWE Algorithm(L, M) does not output s if ei-
ther Test Candidate(s˜, log 1η ) accepts some s˜ 6= s before
an iteration where Field Bernstein-Vazirani outputs s, or
LWE Algorithm outputs ⊥. We can upper bound the
probability of this event by the probability that at least
one of L independent calls to Test Candidate(s˜, log 1η )
accepts some s˜ 6= s or that L independent calls to Field
Bernstein-Vazirani do not output s.
From Lemma IV.2 and using the union bound, the
probability that at least one of L independent calls to Test
Candidate(s˜, log 1η ) accepts some s˜ 6= s is at most(
2k + 1
q
)M
L ≤
(
3k
q
)M
L.
From Theorem IV.1, the probability that s is not the
output of L independent calls to Field Bernstein-Vazirani
is at most (
1− v
20kqn
)L
.
By union bound, LWE Algorithm(L, M) does not out-
put s with probability at most(
1− v
20kqn
)L
+
(
3k
q
)M
L.
Theorem IV.3 follows directly from Theorem B.1 and
picking v = qn, L = 20k ln 1η and M = 1.
Appendix C: Quantum learning complexity of related
problems
In this section we present learning algorithms for prob-
lems that are related to LWE.
1. Learning parity with noise
We show here our result for Learning Parity with
Noise (LPN) problem, which is the LWE problem for
q = 2.
Here, the parity bit is flipped independently for each
element in the superposition with probability η. This is
the same noise model proposed by Bshouty and Jackson
[4]. Note that Cross et al. [5] studied LPN with different
noise models. In the first, all parities in the superposi-
tion are flipped at the same time with probability η. In
the second one, each qubit passed through a depolarising
channel. Our algorithm and analysis also works for both
of the noise models proposed by Cross et al. [5].
The algorithm is the same as in the previous section,
where now the QFT is over F2 (also called the Hadamard
Transform H).
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LemmaC.1. Let 1√
2n
∑a∈{0,1}n |a〉 |a · s + ea (mod 2)〉
be a quantum sample where ea are iid random vari-
ables with value 0 with probability 1 − η and 1 with
probability η.
For every constant 0 < δ < 1, applying a Hadamard
transform on all qubits and measuring them in the com-
putational basis, provides an outcome |j〉 |j∗〉, where j ∈
{0, 1}n and j∗ ∈ {0, 1} such that with probability expo-
nentially close to 1, Pr [j = s] ≥ 12 (1− δ)2(1− 2η)2.
Proof. If we apply Hadamards on each qubit of the sam-
ple state, we have
1
2n+
1
2
∑
a∈{0,1}n
∑
j∈{0,1}n+1
(−1)ea j∗+a·(j+j∗s) |j〉 |j∗〉
We now calculate the probability that j∗ = 1 and the
first qubits are in the state |s〉:
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
2n+
1
2
∑
a∈{0,1}n
(−1)ea+a·(s+s) |s〉
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
1
22n + 1

 ∑
a∈{0,1}n
(−1)ea


2
From the distribution of each ea, we have that (−1)ea
is 1 w.p. 1− η and −1 w.p. η, independently. Therefore
E [(−1)ea ] = 1 − 2η and using Hoeffding’s bound we
have that
Pr

 ∑
a∈{0,1}n
(−1)ea ≤ (1− δ)(1− 2η)2n


< eδ
2(1−2η)222n/4
Therefore, with probability exponentially close to 1,
the probability that j = s is at least
1
22n + 1
((1− δ)(1− 2η)2n)2 = 1
2
(1− δ)2(1− 2η)2.
We can test a candidate solution s˜ in the lines of
Lemma IV.2 and then repeat the process a linear num-
ber of times, and in this case the algorithm can find the
right s with probability exponentially close to 1.
2. LWE over rings
The Ring-LWE problem[10], a variant of LWE over
the ring of polynomials, has been proposed in order to
improve the performance of cryptographic constructions
using LWE, at the cost of needing stronger assumptions
for proving its hardness.
The Ring-LWE problem uses the structure of the ring
Rq = R
/
qR for a prime q, R = Z[x]
/
f (x) and a
cyclotomic polynomial f (x). As in LWE, a Ring-LWE
sample is the pair (a, as+ e (mod q)) for random s, a ∈
Rq and e is picked according to some error distribution
χ.
Unfortunately, our algorithm cannot be used to solve
Ring-LWE with the noise model proposed by Bshouty et
al. [4], due to technical issues on representing the poly-
nomials. In order to use the quantum learning algorithm
for LWE, we need to find an isomorphism φ fromRq to
Z
n
q , where n = ϕ(m) is the number of invertible ele-
ments modulo m. With this isomorphism, we can con-
sider a sample (a, as + e) ∈ R2q as two vectors in Znq ,
and a superposition of quantum states representing these
vectors can be written as:
|ψ〉 = 1√
qn ∑
a∈Rq
|φ(a)〉 |φ(as + ea)〉 ,
and applying the QFT over every register of this state
results in
QFT⊗2n |ψ〉 (C1)
=
1√
q3n
∑
a∈Rq
∑
x,y∈Zq
ωφ(a)·x |x〉 ⊗ωφ(as+ea)·y |y〉
(C2)
=
1√
q3n
∑
a∈Rq
∑
x,y∈Zq
ωφ(a)·(x+yφ(s))+y·φ(ea) |x〉 |y〉 ,
where the second equality holds because φ is a homo-
morphism.
We consider two ways of representing elements inRq
as integer vectors. The first one consists of identifying
a polynomial in Rq with the vector containing its co-
efficients. However, this coefficient embedding is not a
homomorphism to Znq , and the following identity, used
in eq. (C1), does not hold
φ(a) · x + φ(a · s + ea)y = φ(a)(x + yφ(s)) + yφ(ea).
Therefore, this representation of polynomials cannot
be used within our learning algorithm.
The second way of representing a polynomial is
through the map
φ(p(x)) = (p(ωm), . . . , p(ω
m−1
m )),
where ωm ∈ Zq be a primitive m-th root of unity.
This map is particularly interesting since multiplication
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Znq is done component-wise[11] and therefore it can
be used in implementations of Ring-LWE with efficient
multiplication[12]. However, in these constructions, the
error is sampled from a distribution over polynomials
with small coefficients and when after applying the iso-
morphism, φ(ea) can be arbitrarily large in Znq which
cannot be handled by our algorithm if the error is inde-
pendent for each element in the superposition.
Finally, we show now how to do solve Ring-LWE for
the error model presented in Cross et al. [5], namely, the
noise is the same for all elements in the superposition.
Let φ be any isomorphism from Rq to Znq . We can
map the original quantum sample using φ resulting in
1√
qn ∑
a∈Rq
|φ(a)〉 ⊗ |φ(as + e)〉 .
and using the Field Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm on this
state we have
QFT⊗2n |ψ〉
=
1√
q3n
∑
a∈Rq
∑
x,y∈Zq
ωφ(a)·x |x〉 ⊗ωφ(as+e)·y |y〉
=
1√
q3n
∑
y∈Zq
ωy·φ(e) ∑
a∈Rq
∑
x∈Zq
ωφ(a)·(x+yφ(s))) |x〉 |y〉 .
By measuring the last register, the error becomes a global
phase and we are able to retrieve s as shown in Sec-
tion IVA.
3. Learning with Rounding
LWE has been used in the construction of several cryp-
tographic primitives. However, its usage sometimes is
limited. For instance, in the implementation of pseudo-
random functions, the output must use little or no ran-
domness, which does not correspond to the inherent ran-
domness in LWE’s input.
For this purpose, Banerjee, Peikert and Rosen[2] pro-
posed a derandomized version of LWE called Learn-
ing with Rounding (LWR), which does not compromise
hardness. LWR has been used in the construction of
pseudo-random functions [2] and deterministic public
key encryption [16].
The main idea of LWR consists in replacing a · s + ea
by the ’rounding’ of a · s with respect to some modulus
p ≪ q, which can be seen as a “deterministic noise”.
More precisely, the rounding function is defined as fol-
lows:
⌊·⌉p : Zq → Zp, with ⌊x⌉p =
⌊
p
q
x
⌉
(mod p).
An LWR sample is then given by (a, ⌊a · s⌉p) for some
a sampled from the uniform distribution on Fnq .
Corollary C.2. Let
|ψ〉 = 1√
qn ∑
a∈Fnq
|a〉
∣∣∣⌊a · s⌉p〉 ,
be a quantum LWR sample. Let |φ〉 be the state when
we multiply the last register of |ψ〉 with qp . The Field
Bernstein-Vazirani(|φ〉) outputs s with probability at
least
p
12(q−1) .
Proof. For a fixed a, we have that
q
p
⌊a · s⌉p = a · s +
(
q
p
⌊a · s⌉p − a · s
)
(mod q).
Since
−q
2p ≤ qp ⌊a · s⌉p − a · s ≤ q2p (mod q), the result
follows by Theorem IV.1 for k = q2p .
4. Quantum Samples for SIS problem
We present in this section a learning algorithm for an-
other relevant problem in cryptography, the Short Integer
Solution problem. As the name indicates, the Short In-
teger Solution problem (SIS) consists in finding a short
integer solution for a system of linear equations, and we
present now its formal definition.
Definition C.3 (Short Integer Solution). Given a ran-
dom matrix A ∈ Fm×nq , a random vector z ∈ Fmq , the
SISn,m,q,β problem is to find a vector x ∈ Fnq such that
Ax = z (mod q) with ‖x‖ < β.
As in the LWE case, the hardness of SIS is also proved
through the reduction of (expected to be) hard lattice
problems [1][14][7][13]. We remark that if we drop ei-
ther the constraint of having an integer solution or having
a short solution, the problem can be easily solved using
Gaussian Elimination.
The SIS problem and its variants have been
used to prove security of constructions of signature
schemes [8][6], and hash functions [9]. In these schemes,
samples in the form (A, Av) are public, where v is a
small random vector and A is a random matrix.
Inspired in the LWE case, we can define a quantum
sample for SIS problem as
|ψ〉 = 1√
qnm ∑
A∈Fm×nq
|A〉 |Av〉 (mod q),
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and we are interested in the sample complexity of find-
ing the (fixed) short solution v. Using Field Bernstein-
Vazirani brings the same problem of Gaussian Elimina-
tion: there is no guarantee of finding a short solution in-
stead of an arbitrary one.
We notice that tracing out m − 1 rows of A and the
corresponding positions of Av, we remain with
1√
qn ∑
a∈Fnq
|a〉 |a · v〉 ,
and we show an algorithm that works even for this type
of quantum sample.
The algorithm consists by testing all possible values
j ∈ {−k, ..., k} of −vi. The test on j = −vi passes
with probability 1, while the test rejects with constant
probability for j 6= −vi. By repeating the test L times,
the probability of finding the correct value is amplified.
SIS Algorithm(L)
Input: L ∈ Z+
Output: v˜ ∈ Fnq
For i ∈ [n] do:
For j ∈ {−k, ..., k} do:
For l ∈ [L]:
Pick a quantum sample 1√
qn ∑a∈Fnq |a〉 |a · v〉 .
Add jai to the last register
Apply QFT on the i-th qudit of a and measure it
Test next value of j if outcome is not |0〉
Set v˜i = −j and continue with the next value of i.
Output v˜
Theorem C.4. Let v ∈ Fnq whose coefficients are all
smaller in absolute value than some bound k. Given the
quantum samples in the form
|ψ〉 = ∑
a∈Fnq
|a〉 |a · v〉 ,
SIS Algorithm(L) outputs v with probability 1− 2km
qL
.
Proof. We start by doing the analysis of SIS algorithm
for i = 1. After adding ja1 to the last register of the
quantum sample, we have
1√
qn ∑
a∈Fnq
|a〉 |a · v + a1 j〉
=
1√
qn ∑
a1∈Fq
∑
a∈Fn−1q
|a1〉 |a〉 |a1(v1 + j) + a · v〉 .
If j = −v1, then the previous state is the product state
1√
q ∑
a1∈Fq
|a1〉 ⊗ 1√
qn−1 ∑
a∈Fn−1q
|a〉 |a · v〉 .
and since QFT ∑a1∈Fq |a1〉 = |0〉, the test passes for all
l ∈ [L].
On the other hand, if j 6= −v1, then the state is entan-
gled, and the reduced density matrix of the first register
is
1
q ∑
a1∈Fq
|a1〉 〈a1| .
In this case, after applying the QFT on the first regis-
ter and measuring it, the output is |0〉 with probability
1
q . Therefore, we have v˜1 = −j if for all L indepen-
dent samples the measurement outcome after the QFT is
|0〉, and this happens with probability 1
qL
. By the union
bound, the probability that the test passes for any value
j 6= −vi is at most 2kqL .
Finally, the previous analysis holds for every i ∈ [n].
Since v 6= v˜ iff there exists an i ∈ [n] such that v˜i 6= vi,
we can use union bound again to show that this happens
with probability at most 2km
qL
.
By picking L = max{1, log
2km
η
log q }, the algorithm out-
puts the correct v with probability at least 1− η.
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